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ABSTRACT
Recent analyses of the gains to policy coordination have focussed on the
strategic aspects of macroeconomic policymaking in a static setting. A major
theme is that noncooperative policy making is likely to be Pareto inefficient
because of the presence of beggar—thy—neighbor policies. This paper extends the
analysis to a dynamic setting, thereby introducing three important points of
realism to the static game. First, the payoffs to beggar—thy—neighbor policies
look very different in one—period and multiperiod games, and thus so do the
gains to coordination. Second, we show that policy coordination may reduce eco-
nomic welfare if governments are nyopic in their policy making, as is sometimes
claimed. Third, governments act under a fundamental constraint that they cannot
bind the actions of later governments, and we investigate how this constraint
alters the gains to policy coordination.
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FranceI.Introduction
In an earlier essay (Oudiz and Sachs, 19814) we investigated the quanti-
tative gains to international policy coordination in a static environment. In
this paper, we begin to extend the analysis to a dynamic setting. However,
because of several new methodological issues, this first step is more theoretical
than empirical. The extension to dynamics introduces three important points of'
realism to the static game. First, the payoffs to beggar—thy—neighbor policies
may look very different in one—period and nultiperiod games, so that the need
for policy coordination may be different in the two games. Second, it is often
claimed that governments are shortsighted in macroeconomic planning, and
support for this view has come from the literature on political business
cycles.1 We should therefore investigate whether international policy
coordination is likely to exacerbate or meliorate this shortsighted behavior.
Third, governments act under a fundamental constraint that they cannot bind the
actions of later governments (or even of themselves at a future date). In
principle, therefore, optimizing governments mist take into account how future
governments will behave in view of the economic environment that they inherit.
We study the implications for policy coordination of this inability to bind
future governments.
Let us consider these three points in turn. In the static game,
uncoordinated macroeconomic policy—making is typically inefficient because of a
prisoner's dilemma in policy choices. Consider, for example, two countries that
are attempting to move optimally along a short—run Phillips curve. It may be
that each country will choose contractionary policies no matter what the other
country selects, though the policy pair (expand, expand) is better for both—2—
countries than the non—cooperative equilibrium (contract, contract). As we
showed in our earlier study, this situation arises naturally under flexible
exchange rates, since by contracting while the other country is expanding, a
country can appreciate its currency and export some of its inflation abroad. It
is this beggar—thy—neighbor action that gives rise to the prisoner!s dilemma.
Cooperation, say in the form of a binding international commitment to expand,
may be useful in moving the countries to the efficient equilibrium.
The question arises whether the payoff structure in a niiltiperiod, or
infinite—horizon game will look the same. The reason for doubt is simple.
In almost all macroeconomic models, policies which lead to a short—run real
appreciation also lead to long—run real depreciation, or at least a return to
the initial real exchange rate. In this circumstance, farsighted players would
understand that a short—run beggar—thy—neighbor appreciation is less attractive
than it looks, since it will be reversed in the long run, at which point the
country reimports the inflation that it earlier sent abroad. To this extent,
the beggar—thy—neighbor policy loses its appeal, and the need for coordination
is reduced.
The second theme introduced in a rinltiperiod setting is the nvopic
behavior of governments. In considering public welfare in a nnltiperiodgame,
it is natural to consider a payoff of the form:
(1) =ETt(T1)
Here, U is the intertemporal utility of country i as of time zero. u(T) is
the instantaneous utility of the country at time t, as a function of a vector
of macroeconomic targets T. is a pure rate of time preference, with S C 1,—3—
sothat the future is discounted relative to the present.
In view of the evidence on political business cycles, in which governments
attemptto nanipulate Tin conjunction with upcoming elections, it seems
naturalto suggest that if (i) is the "true" social welfare function, the
government's social welfare function takes the form:
(2) =
where C T and C S. That is, its planning horizon is shorter than the
econort,r's, or its discounting of the future is higher.
In this view,thepublic is partly a hostage of a self—serving government.
The policy choices reflect the incumbent government's goals, and not the
public's. If this is so, we can ask whether international policy coordination
is likely to improve or worsen this sub—optimal situation. At an abstract
level, the arguments seem to fall on both sides. Some critics, for example,
have characterized policy coordination as a cartel of the incumbents, in which
each policymaker helps the others to nanipulate the political business cycle.
As an example of this, policymakers may have a short—run expansionary bias if
expansion shows up as output today and as inflation only many years in the
future. To some extent, the fear of currency depreciation following a
unilateral expansion keeps this bias in check. That is, the flexible exchange
rate provides discipline on the shortsighted government. With policy
coordination, the fear of currency depreciation can be removed by a commitment
of all countries to expand. In this way, policy coordination may give incumbent
governments a free hand to undertake overly inflationary policies.—'4—
Onthe other hand, we canthinkof circumstances in which policy
coordination ties the hand of incumbents, and thus prevents suchself-serving
policies. An international gold standard, for example, might impose discipline
on governments that would not exist in each country alone. To analyze this
possibility fully we would have to examine each government's incentive to stick
with a particular rule, and the extent to which internationally certifiedrules
are more or less durable than rules undertaken unilaterally. For example, each
country on its own could adopt a gold standard. What, if anything, is added by
a nulticountry commitment?
The third theme introduced in a nultiperiod setting is that of "time—
consistency" of optimal plans. Even in circumstances in which the current
government (or current administration) has the public's interest at heart, its
ability to nuximize social welfare nay be limited by its inability to pre—coinmit
the actions of (well—meaning) future governments. In these circumstances, the
current government must choose its optimal policy taking as given the policy
rules that will be pursued in the future. That is, it mast optimize today,
assuming that future governments will optimize under the assumption that yet
future governments will optimize, and so on. In general this constrained
optimization yields a lower level of social welfare than does the case in which
the government can choose not only its own policies but those of future
governments as well.
Many authors, including Barro and Gordon (1983) and Rogoff (1983), have
given examples in which the inability to bind future policies imparts an
inflationary bias to the econorw. In these examples, wage setters set wages—5—
beforemacroeconomic policy is set. Once the wages are set, policymakers have
an incentive to expand the econonv to reduce real wages, and raise output. Wage
setters anticipate these policies, and choose inflationary wage settlements in
anticipation. If the government can pre—commit to avoid inflationary policies,
the econOnw can get the same ex post output levels at a lower rate of inflation.
Unfortunately, such a pre—coinmitment is not credible since the government has an
incentive to renege on it after the wages are set.
As Rogoff stresses, this time consistency problem nay have important
consequences for international policy coordination. If the inability to bind
future policies leads to an inflationary bias, international policy coordination
may further exacerbate this bias by eliminating each country's concern about
currency depreciation. Thus, even when a sequence of governments within each
country is trying to maximize that country's true social welfare function,
policy coordination nay make the situation worse rather than better.
We consider later on several factors that tend to weaken this pessimistic
conclusion. First, in infinite—horizon games, governments nay be able to invest
in a "reputation" in order to overcome the time—inconsistency problem (as
illustrated in Barro and Gordon (1983)). In other words, a government's
credibility may be judged by its willingness to honor a program laid down by an
earlier government, so nuch that it continues the policy rather than
reoptimizing during its incumbency. We will provide an example of this
solution to the time inconsistency problem. Second, to the extent that the time
inconsistency problem revolves around the exchange rate, policy coordination nay
actually eliminate the problem. In examples later in the paper, optimal—6—
coordinated policies in our a two—country nrdel turn out to be time—consistent.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we set out a
simple dynamic macroeconomic model characterized by flexible exchange rates and
perfect foresight on the part of the private and public sectors. In
Section III, we describe various equilibria in a one—country version of the
model, to highlight the implications of time inconsistency. Next, in Section
IV, we describe the various equilibria in the two—country version of the game,
including the welfare gains or losses from policy coordination. Extensions and
conclusions are discussed in a final section.
II. k Simple Dynamic Macroeconomic Model
We consider a simple model of the sort explored by Dornbusch (l9J6). The
home country produces output Q, at price F, and trades with a foreign country,
which produces Q* at price P. The domestic exchange rate E measures units of
home currency per unit of foreign currency, so that the relative price of the
home good is F/EP*. Demand for the home good is a decreasing function of P/EP*
and of the real interest rate, and an increasing function of Q*• Letting lower
case variables p, q, and e represent the logarithms of their upper—case
counterparts, we write demand for home goods as:
(3) = —o[i_(p+1_ptfl
+yq
Here, i is the nominal interest rate, and i — the home real interest
rate at time t (p1 is the expectation of at time t). Under the perfect
foresight assumption, which we hereafter maintain, p1 = forall t 0.
The money demand equations take the standard transactions form:—7--
() m
—= aq—ci





with =a/cand p =1/c.Following Dornbusch, we assume perfect capital
mobility, so that uncovered interest arbitrage holds:
(6)e+1_eit_i
Again, assuming perfect foresight, we solve for equilibria with e1 =
forall t.
It remains to specify wage and price dynamics. First, the (log) consumer




Home prices are written as a fixed markup over wages:
(8)
Finally, nominal wage change, w+1 —w1,
is made a function of lagged nominal
price change, p —p1,output, and output change:
(9) t+l-t = + + 6
Note that since w1 —isa function of lagged rather than contemporaneous
price change, the system will display typical Keynesian features, particularly
the non—neutrality of with respect to contemporaneous and future anticipated
changes in tnt. This is the standard presumption in the Dornbusch model that the—8—
labor market clears more slowly than the asset markets.
In the next section, we will introduce corresponding equations for the
second country, in order to construct a two—country model. Here, we focus on
the one—country case by making the small—country assumption for the home economy
that p, i, and q* are given for all t0. By doing so, we can write the








In any given period,p1,
and are given by the past history of the
econoritr. These are the "pre—detennined" variables of the economy. rnand
indeed the entire sequence of m, is chosen as a policy variable. p, i, and
are exogenous forcing variables of the system from the point ofview of the
home economy.
As is typical of perfect foresight models, an asset price such as e is
determined not by past history but by forward—looking behavior of asset holders.
In particular, for given values of p1 , and given sequences of p,
ii',andq* from ttoinfinity, there is typically a unique value of esuchthat
theexchange rate does not grow or collapse explosively (technically, this
unique value of e puts the economy on its stablemanifold). Such a unique
value of eexistsas long as the eigenvalue associated with einthe A matrix is
isoutside of the unit circle, and the remaining eigenvalues are on or within—9—
the unit circle. In the simulations reported below, this condition is always
satisfied.
The goal of economic policy in our model will be to naximize a social
welfare function as in (i) or (2), subject to the constraint in (10). The
assumption that e is always such as to keep the econonw on the saddlepoint path
(or stable innifold) requires that economic agents have complete knowledge as to
the path of future policies. In this sense, the government is like a
Stackelberg leader with respect to the private sector, choosing monetary policy
with a view to affecting e and thereby more basic economic targets, while e is
chosen taking as given the future sequence of m. This is not to say, however,
that governments can necessarily choose any sequence of m that they desire. A
large part of the discussion that follows describes the "admissible" sequences
of policies.
As a concrete example of this model, we will suppose that instantaneous
utility u(T) is a quadratic function of inflation, =p
—p1,
and the




Note that t is a parameter reflecting the weight attached to relative to q.
is the discount factor. We have written the utility function with an infinite
horizon, and we will point out shortly some special features of the problem that
arise with such a formulation.
We now turn to the optimal policy for m. It may seem straightforward to—10—
maximize (11) subject to (io), but as Phelps and Pollak (1968) first explained,
and Kydland and Prescott (1917) further elucidated, the maximization is quite
problematic. Here we sketch the problem, and treat it in greater detail below.
Suppose that we apply optimal control techniques to the problem of
maximizing U0 subject to (10), taking as given p0, p, q1. For simplicity,
we set p =i
== 0for all t0. The result of this straightforward
control problem will be an infinite sequence m0,m1,..., denoted hereafter
that maximizes U0. Let us write this optimal choice of monetary policy as
We have already noted that e0 will in general be a function of p0, c1, q1
and the entire sequence fii}0. The first step of this sequence is
Given %,e,
p0, c1, and q1, we can use(io) to find p, p0, q0. Suppose
now that at time 1 the policymakers reoptimize, in order to maximize U 1subject
(io). Once again, a simple control problem will yield a sequence nrm2.... now
denoted as {rn}1. In general,willnot equal rn for t > 1, so that the
government at time 1 will not want to carry on with the optimal plan as of time
zero. If the government at time 1 is not bound (e.g. by a constitution) to
carry out theearlier plan will be scrapped.
As Kydland and Prescott stressed, we cannot simply assume away this
problem by letting the initial government choose %,thenext choose m1, etc.;
i.e. by letting each succeeding government optimize anew, using the optimal
control solution (this is close to what Buiter (1983) proposes, incorrectly we
believe, as discussed below). The problem is iruch deeper, for the following
reason. The choice is optimal only under the assumption that it is followed
by th1,th2,... It has no particular attractiveness given that it will be
followed by m1 and other * for t > 2. Moreover, the exchange rate e0—11—
will be a function not of ,asthe original government's solution assumed,
but rather of the actual m that will be selected.
Phelps and Pollak, and Kydland and Prescott, provided the answer to this
difficulty. Unless the original government can act to bind all future
governments, it nust optimize with the full knowledge that all future
governments will be free to optimize. A time consistent equilibrium is one in
which each government optimizes its policy choice taking as given the policy
rules (or specific policy actions) that future governments will use. With a
finite time horizon, such an optimization is easy to carry out. Let
xT represent the inherited stateof the econonzr in the final period T. In our
example xT would be the vector <PT' GivenXT it is easy to find
the best policy =fT(xT)
that maximizes LT sTij. At time T—l, the
penultimate government knows that its successor will follow =
fT(xT).
It
is then an easy task to maximize ET Tu subject to (10) and the constraint
= Thissecond optimization will yield the nile =
Bybackward recursion, every government could thereby find a policy rule fjx.)
that is optimal given the rules that succeeding administrations will follow.
Such rules will be credible to the private sector (e.g. the asset holders in the
foreign exchange market) because each government is doing the best that it can
given the freedom of action of future governments.
In an infinite—horizon setting, the solution of the time—consistency issue
is a bit nore complex, as we shall soon see. The problem is that there is
likely to be a multiplicity, perhaps an infinity, of policy rules that have the
property that they are optimal given that future governments will also choose—12—
the rule. There is an embarrassing abundance of time—consistent policies. Not
only is it hard to find all of these solutions, butitis not necessarily
straightforward to choose among them.
In summary, there are typically two types of equilibria in imltiperiod
planning problems. The first type assumes that the initial government can
pre—commit to an entire sequence of moves, or to a policy rule. For this type
of problem, optimal contrcl suffices. The second type of problem nore
realistically assumes that each government can nake its "move," but cannot bind
the hand of future governments. It must therefore optimize, taking as given the
freedom of choice of future governments. Before proceeding to the imiticountry
setting, it is useful to study some more technical aspects of these two
approaches.
Pre—commitnient Equilibria
There are two types ofpre—conmitmentequilibria. In the first, the
governmentselects an entire sequence jm} that by assumption will be carried
out at all future dates. In the second, the initial government selects a rule
= that is also assumed to bind all future governments. The
first equilibrium is termed an open—loop solution, and the second, a closed—loop
solution. Both solutions will tend to be time—inconsistent, except in special
cases, in the sense that future governments will want to deviate from the
original sequence (in the open—loop case), or the original rule (in the
closed—loop case), even if they believe that other governments would abide by
the original plans.—13—
Wenow calculate the optimal open—loop equilibrium in order to pinpoint the
source of the time inconsistency. Starting with (io), we write the elements of'
the A matrixas the B matrix as b1. and the C matrix as cj (the specific
valuesof and are given in the footnote preceding equation (io)).
Tin fact C can be ignored under our simplifying assumption that p == i=0
for t0. Thus =a11P
+a12p1
+a131÷ a1e +b11mwhile
similar expressions hold for p, q, and e+1. The goal is to choose the
sequence Juliothatmaximizes U0 in (11) subject to (io). Tosolve this problem,







As is well known, p2,0'
and 1130 are shadow values which describe how
U0






Byanalor, equals 3U0f3e0; that is I1}40measures the change in
intertemporalutility for a smallchange in e0. Unlike p0, c1, and
however, the policymaker does not inherit e0,but rather determines e0 as a
functionof the policies that are selected. Because e0is a policychoice, a
necessary condition of the optimization must therefore be that aU0/3e0 =
=0.At the optimum, 4twillequal zero at t=0.—lt—
The time consistency problem arises because along the optimum sequence
will (in general) not always equal zero. (p will follow
a difference equation of the form described in theAppendix). Since will
tend to rrcve away from iero, reoptimization at any t when *0would lead to
a new sequence of m such that would again start at zero (a necessary
condition of the optimization). From a technical point of view, the open—loop
sequence is time consistent if and only if the equationfor can be
satisfied with 0 for all t )0.If this condition is met, then future
governments will choose at all dates t even if they are not bound by the
original government. If the condition is not satisfied, the open—loopsolution
makes sense only if future governments are not allowed to reoptimize.
Consider a simple illustration using our ttdel. We select simulation
values for the key parameters of the rrndel, as shown in Table 1.The econorw
inherits a ten—percent domestic inflation rate, and lagged full employment
(i.e. p0 =0.10;p1 =0.0; =0.0;q1 =o.o).With a constant exchange
rate (e0 =o),CPI inflation will equal ten percent in period zero (i.e.
=0.10),
while a currency appreciation can reduce the initial CPI inflation rate.Given
our parameter values, the optimal sequence jmn}0 is sharply contractionaryat
t =0,so that output is pushed below zero, with the goalof reducing inflation.
The real exchange rate p0 —e0
—p
appreciates at t =0,!47 percent above its
long runvalue,with the currency appreciation helping to export inflation
abroad. Figure 1 shows the optimal paths of inflation, output, and thereal
exchange rate.(19814 is taken as t =o).
Consider the behavior of p14'

















- no——•—-— -——•k L——-—-———
I I I I I




Figure1.Open-Loop Control in the One—Country Model—17—
positive, meaning that an increase in e would raise welfare. From the point of
view of the government at time t =3(1987), for example, the original plan is
too contractionary, since a currency depreciation would raise welfare. A new
optimization at t =3would lead to a new sequence jrn}0, with in3 >
This is shown in Figure 3, where we superimpose j?4and Looselyspeaking,
the initial government, at t =0,has an incentive to announce a stern set of
future monetary policies in order to induce a currency appreciation at t =0,
and thereby to reduce 1l (which is otherwise very high). Of course, e0 can be
reduced by extremely low in0 and higher in for t ) 1, or by more ncderate and
somewhat lower rn for t ) 1. The optimal policy is to opt for nderate and
low future in, rather than extremely restrictive in0, since the approach with
restrictive future m achieves the same currency appreciation with a somewhat
lower loss of initial output, q0.
Thus, from the perspective at t =0,it is worthwhile to commit future in to
low values for the sake of e0. However, from the perspective of future
governments, e3 is a bygone, and in should reflect tradeoffs in the present and
future, not the past. Thus, by the tine a future government assumes office,
part of the original incentive to keep in low has disappeared, and the new
optimization in period t consequently yields a higher value of in.
It is interesting to note that there is a single special case in which the
open—loop policy is also tine consistent, and that is when a =0in the original
model (i.e. output is not affected by the real interest rate). In that case,
E 0 satisfies the equation for derived in the Appendix.3 From an
economic point of view, when a =0,only the exchange rate e0, butnot theI
—18—











M: Open—looppolicy with reoptimization in 1987
—19—
Figure 3. Reoptiiuizatlon of Open—Loop Control In 1987










sequence of future m, affects and so that there is no reason to prefer
one path of m over another as long as they both lead to the same e0. The same
is true about all future e. This property allows the original government to
specify a path that all future governments will be content to honor.
The open—loop equilibrium is the best pre—commitment equilibrium available.
It is sometimes argued, however, that while governments cannot credibly
pre—commit future governments to a sequence of policy nnves, they nay be able to
pre—commit governments to a specific policy rule for m. Such a closed—loop
rule might not be as good as the open—loop result, but it might be better than
no rule at all. There is some merit to this argument, as we shall soon see.
The rule can of course be of varying complexity. We illustrate this case by
choosing a simple rule, which links rn to the current state of the economy, as
described by the vector x q1>. Such a rule is termed memoryless, in
that the past history of the economy, in arriving at<PtPtiQl>, is not
permitted to affect In. We simplify further by specifyingni as a linear
function of t't—l' and
(13) ni =+ lt÷ B2p1 +
Ourmethod of solution is straightforward. A solution of the form (13) is
guessed. Using (10) and the assumption that e0 places the economy on the stable
manifold, we find U3 as a function of the rule. Implicitly then
U0 =u0(0,1,e2,3).Using a standard numerical optimization technique, we
then proceed to maximize U0 with respect to o'l'2'3' to arrive at the
optimal rule 1%= + + + 3q1.Given our assumed parameter
values for the structural ncdel, we find:—21—
(lu) =—.038Pt +1.027p1 +0.322
Note that this is the optimal linear nile for a given x0 =
<p0,pC1 q.> =
<0.1,0.0, 0.0>. For a different starting point, we would find a different rule.
Time—Consistent Equilibria
The previous equilibria depend on the unsatisfactory assumption that future
governments can be bound by rules made at an earlier date. Some writers have
suggested that macroeconomic policies must therefore be formulated as
constitutional rules, in order to bind successfully at a later date. For many
reasons, including conflicting views about the correct rules, unwillingness to
tamper with a constitution, and the realization that even constitutions can be
amended at a later date, there is little likelihood the macroeconomic policy
will soon be etched in constitutional stone. In practice, therefore,
governments nust operate with the knowledge that future governments have freedom
to change course and will have incentives to do so, relative to the open—loop
or closed—loop optimum, even when the future governments share the goals of the
earlier governments.
In this circumstance, we can reformulate the policy problem as a game among
an infinite number of players (i.e., governments), who are identified by the
time period in which they act. The initial nove is made by the government at t
=0(hereafter G0), then by G1, and so on. The payoff functions for Gt is
-t i
Eit Ut(T), and the move is m.
Now, we can think of various types of' Nash equilibria among these
governments. In analor to the pre—commitment case, we can think of Nash—22—
equilibria in which each government takes as given the moves of other
governments, or Nash equilibria in which each government takes as given policy
rules of other governments. A Nash equilibrium in moves will be called
"open—loop," and a Nash equilibrium in strategies or policy rules will be called
"closed—loop."
Consider first the case of open—loop Nash equilibrium. Let {zn} t denote
the sequence of moves before and after, but not including, period t:
open—loop Nash equilibrium is a sequence
Nw N
{m },withthe property that for all governments, inis optimal taking as
given
(15) {mgris an open—loop Nash equilibrium if and only if for
N
all t, tn maximizes Z.t U. subject to (io) and given jm
Inperforming the optimization at period t, the government assumes that e
adjusts to keep the econon on the stable manifold, given the past history of m,
the current policy choice xn, and the assumed future path
With this definition, the problem with the precommitment equilibrium is
that the resulting path is not a Nash equilibrium among the infinite sequence of
governments (this was verified in Figure 3). Taking as given that other
governments will play \(theopen—loop sequence), only the initial government
will want its part of the sequence (i.e. Forall other governments (in
general), there will exist a superior choice of policy.
Now, consider the "closed—loop" version of Nash equilibrium, in which
we assume that plays a rule (or strate,r) f, which maps to—23—
rather than just a move tnt. As before, define the sequence !i_as
f0,
1••••tl Now, we define a Nash equilibrium in this strategy space
as follows:
(16) is a closed—loop Nash equilibrium if and only if for all t,
= naximizes E.S U subject to (10),
and given
In general, there will be r.ny such Nash equilibria, some of which (as we shall
see) are not very desirable.
ks is typical in such circumstances, we further refine the nature of the
equilibrium to include only Nash perfect equilibria. A strategy sequence
is said to be a perfect equilibrium if for any history of the econonbr from time
otot (even histories not resulting from a Nash equilibrium during periods
otot), strategies {f} constitute a Nash equilibrium in the sub—game
from t to .Wenow define time consistency:
(17) (f}time consistent if and only if is a Nash
perfect equilibrium.
In general, open—loop Nash equilibria, as in (15), will not be perfect
equilibria. Suppose, for example, that the sequence nz.1,rn2,... has the Nash
property. In most models, including those in our paper, the sequence
will not be subgame Nash (starting at period 2), if m1 is set
differently from m1. Thus, from this point on, we restrict our search for
time—consistent equilibria to closed—loop Nash equilibria, in which governments
take as given the policy rules of other governments.
Unfortunately, even the perfectness concept does not eliminate the problem—24—
of a multiplicity of equilibria. There will in general be manytrulytime—
consistent equilibria.To narrow the search, we begin with the simplest case,
in which m is a function of the current state x
alone (see Maskin and Pirole (1983) for some justification for restricting our





subject to (10) and to the restriction that
=f(x.)for all i * t.
1 1
(Notethat in this case the government at time t does not actually care about
the rules up to time t, since the past is fully summarized in xv). Implicit
throughout is the assumption that e is always such as to keep the economy on
the stable manifold. In practice, this meansthat along with f there is another
functionh linking e and x :e =h(x). ttt t
Ourstrategy is to search for f among the class of linear functions.
klthough we cannot prove that the resulting function is the unique menoryless,
time—consistent equilibrium, we suspect that it is in fact unique, in view of
the linear—quadratic structure of the underlying problem. Consider the




+ Y31be a candidate solution (call it the 1—rule). Plugging this rule into







that keeps the econonw on the stable manifold. Now, suppose that these rules hold
t
for all t >1.It is possible to calculate Ei as a function of the rule
and the state of the econonr at t =1,i.e. x1. Let uscallthe value of the—25—
utility function VI(xi), where V1 denotes the dependence of utility on the
rule 1•
th t
Attimezero,the 0government wants to YTaximize Et_O8Ut, which equals
U0 +6V(x1)
under the assumption that future governments will use the 1—rule.
Note that x1 =<p1,p,q).
Specifically, the initial government solves the
following:



































(g)ppcq and V given
In this optimization problem, (a) is determined by the candidate 1—rule.
(b)—(e) are the structural dynamic equations summarized in (io).(r) is the
instantaneous utility function (note that =p
—pt).Finally, (g) defines
the state of the econov for the initial government.












using (b), (c) and (d) together with the new equation for e0, we have four—26—
equations that irake e0, pg, a, and p1 linear functions of m0andthe
























Now simply impose the first—order condition that





This gives us a linear rule for as a function of p0, p, q1 and implicitly







Under our assumptions, the partial derivatives of are linear functions of
p p and q1 (though not easy to write down analytically!). Thus, in0isa
linear rule in p0. p, and
(23) =6
+ + 62Tl+63q1
As long as (23) is the same as the y rule, we have found a stationary,
time—consistent rule. That is, for 6 =10,'1 =11,2 =2'63 =13
the y
rule is validated as a time—consistent policy. Starting at !flLperiodt and any
state t, the tth government will choose the I rule given that all future
governments will make that choice.
In general, the time—consistent rule nust be found numerically (see Cohen
and Michel (1984) for an elegant treatment of the one—dimensional case for the
state vector x, for which an analytical solution is found). To do so, we start
with a finite—period problem, in which Eo3tut. It is then easy to find the
optimal final period rule 1%= fT(XT).Given TT' T—1 is readily found by the
ty-pe of backward recursion just described. For each T, we can readily compute
f0(x0). Denote this rule as f(x0) to denote the dependence of the rule on the
periods remaining. Then it is a simple matter to find the limiting value of
f(x0) as T +. Therule f(x0) =limf(x0) can then be verified directly to
have the time—consistency, Nash equilibrium property for the infinite—horizon
game. We provide details of this method in the Appendix.
Using the parameter values described earlier, the time—consistent rule is
calculated to be:
(2k) zn =—.032Pt +1.032 +.275
As is shown in the Appendix, the open—loop optimal policy can be written as a—28—
linear function of the state variables and
(25) m =—.019Pt ÷ 1.019 p1 + .272 + .389
Starting, as before, with 10 percent inflation, we can compute the pathof output
andinflation for the time—consistent policy, for comparison with the open—loop
pre—cornmitrnent equilibrium. In Figure a, we compare the inflation performance
in the two cases; in Figure 14b, we compare the exchange rates; and in Figure 1c,
we compare the output paths. We have already seen thatthe open—loop control
holdsfuture governments to an over—contractionary policy relative to the one
that they would select upon reoptimization. Since the time—consistent policy
explicitlyallows for (expansionary) reoptimization in the future, it is
notsurprising that the real exchange rate is less appreciated in the time—
consistent (Tc) case than in the open—loop (OL) case. Simply, agents recognize
thatfuture governments will select more expansionary m, ande is an
increasing function of the entire sequence of m. Thus, <1t, viathe
exchangerate effect. In general, q < qTC in the early periods, as
governments In the OL case pursue a steady, contractionary policy. After a
certain period (shown as t in Figure be), the inequality is reversed. Both
policies reduce the inherited inflation to zero in the long nan.
Before turning to a welfare ranking of the various policies, we must note a
key feature of the disinflation process (pointed out earlier in Buiter and







































































































































































































































































































































































































Supposean economy inherits an inflation rate of Aç =p0
—p1,with r1 =q1
=0.
By simple forward integration of (26) from t =0,we have
(27) t+l—Pt) =+ (l_A)r+*:1=01
+
Now,for all of the equilibria so far considered, —
Ptequals zero in the
long run (i.e. inflation is eliminated), r returns to zero (i.e. no long—run
change in competitiveness), and returns to zero (i.e. long—run full
employment). Thus, taking limits of (21), we find 0 =A0
+4Z.0q1, or
(28) 0q. =
Allpolicies have the same cumulative output loss, no ratter what is the time
path of exchange rates, money, etc.! Thus, the welfare issue is always one of
timing, rather than the overall nagnitude of lost output.
On purely logical grounds, we can rank the welfare achieved by the three
policies so far studied: open—loop control, closed—loop control (with
pre—coinmitment), and time—consistent control. The open—loop control is clearly
first best, since both of the other solutions reflect the same optimization, but
under additional constraints. The closed—loop, linear feedback rule also nust
produce higher utility than the time—consistent rule. Both the linear rule and
time—consistent solution choose as a linear function of x; the linear rule
is chosen as the best among this class of functions, so in particular it is
better than the time—consistent rule. Thus we know that > u. In
general, the inequalities will be strict, though we bave already noted special
cases (e.g. c =0)in which all of the policies are identical.—31—
Buiter (1983) has recently proposed an alternative strate' for finding a
time—consistent linear rule (we describe his approach at length in the
appendix). His reasoning is as follows. Consider the open—loop control
solution, with shadow prices p1, u2, and p3 on the state variables, and on the
exchange rate. At t =0,the initial government chooses policies so that
p4,0
=0.For t > 0, we know that will tend to deviate from zero. Each
government in period t would like to reset hu144 =0.Baiter proposes,
therefore, that a time—consistent solution is found by assuming that E 0
for all t, and dropping the open—loop dynamic equation for When this
procedure is followed, we obtain the following linear rule:
(29) m =.237p + .763 p1 + .229
There are two counts against this proposed solution. Most important,
it is simply not time consistent. If all governments for t > 1 adopt the Baiter
rule, the government at t =0would not choose this rule. By following the
procedures described earlier (for calculating the best rule at t =0for a given
rule at t ) 1) we find that the initial government would choose:
(30) m0 =—.147p0 + 1.147 c1 + .309
The logic underlying the Buiter solution seems problematic as well. The
merit for a government to choose p =0comes if the sequence of in
corresponding to =0will in fact be carried out by future governments,
But, by construction, each succeeding government alters the chosen sequence of
m. There is simply no attraction to choosing =0if the government knows
that its plans will not be carried forward. The private sector understands this
point perfectly, by setting e to correspond to the actual sequence of in rather—32—
than to the sequence planned by each government. In a nutshell, Buiter's
government is naive in assuming that future governments will carry out its
open—loop optimum, at the same time that the private sector is completely on top
of the policy—making process, and knows that future governments will reoptimize.
Reputation and Tinae—Cnsistency
In the previous section we simplified our search for a time—consistent
policy to "memoryless" rules. Such rules nake m a function of the
contemporaneous state vector but not of the past history of x and m. Many
policies in the real world depend on the history of a game as much as the
current state. In competitive environments, for example, aggressive behavior by
one player at time t—l might bring forward retaliation by others at period t, as
in"tit—for--tat" strategies. Game theorists have long understood that such
history—dependent strategies can help competing players to achieve rmre
efficient outcomes than those obtainable from memoryless strategies alone.
Itturns out that similar complex strategies can help a sequence of
governments to achieve a better equilibrium than the one obtained by the
memoryless rule m =1(x).
Consider a compound rule of the sort:
(31) (a) Government t chooses its policy according to =(x)
as long as
all governments j C t have also selected policy this way;
(b) If any government j C t selectsm
* g(x), then government t selects
=1(x).
where f is the menoryless, time—consistent rule.
Suppose now that the rule (x) is better than 1(x) in the sense that if' all—33—
governments t )0choose g(x) they achieve utility >U.Also, suppose that
itself is not time consistent in the sense of (19): If all governments
t >1 are known to choose (x), it is not optimal for the government at t =0to
select g(x0).
The surprising result is that while (x) is not time consistent, a
compound strategy like (3l)(a)—(b) can be time consistent with the result that
all governments end up playing g(x) leading to higher social welfare. In the
memoryless time—consistency problem, each government takes as given the choice
of policy rule followed by future governments. If future governments are going
to choose m =g(x),
the current government nay have no particular incentive to
choose g. With a compound rule as in (31), the government at time t knows that
it affects the policy rule selected by future governments. It takes as given
the two—part decision mechanism (a)—(b), but it recognizes that if it is the
first government to deviate from (x) it will cause all future governments to
choose f(x) instead of (x). Since >U1'by assumption, this deviation from
g(x) imposes a cost, which deters the government from deviating from
Thus, each government operates under a "threat" that future governments
will revert to f(x) if the current government fails to play m =(x).
Game
theorists have long recognized that such a threat mechanism is viable only if
the reversion to 1(x) is credible. For example, suppose that the rule is "let
money growth obey the open—loop strategy or else each future government lets
money grow by one million percent." If every government takes it as given that
future governments hold this rule, then noney growth will indeed obey the—34—
open—loop strate' (governments would seek to avoid the hyperinflation that they
fear would otherwise ensue).A true intertemporal Nash equilibrium is obtained,
in which the open—loop sequence is carried out by every government. The problem
here, of course, is that the threat of hyperinflation is not rational. Surely,
if any government does violate the open—loop rule, the next government will not
exercise the threat. Knowing this, no government really has an incentive to
persist in the open—loop path.
Game theorists therefore restrict the threats to actions that would indeed
be carried out if deviations from (x) occur (even if, as in the example, the
threats need never actually be carried out). It is here that the assumption of
perfection of equilibrium becomes important. In the hyperinflation example just
cited, not all subgames are Nash, and thus the proposed equilibrium is not
perfect. To see this, suppose that G0 deviates. Even if G1 assumes that all
future governments will play the hyperinflation threat, it is not optimal for
government 1 to play the threat. Thus the subgame in which government 0
deviates, and all Gt > 1 )letm grow by 1 million percent per period, is not
a Nash equilibrium. G1 can do better unilaterally, taking as given the actions
of other G.
As long as the reversion is to f(x), i.e. the threat is to return to the
time—consistent rule, the threat is credible. After all, if a government
believes that all future governments will play f(x) it is optimal for the
government itself to play f(x). Every subgame consisting of the infinite
sequence of governments playing f(x) is therefore a Nash equilibrium.
Now we argue that by this nchanism the sequence of governments can sustain—35—
anylinear rule =&(x),
as long as the utility from this rule is higher than
the utility from the nemoryless time—consistent rule for any x. We want to show,
therefore, that the following strate for each government constitutes a perfect
Nash equilibrium, in which m =£(x)is always played..
(32) (a) Each government chooses m =t(x)
as long as all governments
j <thave also selected this rule;
(b) If any government j <tselects a different nI, then all governments
t select ru =f(x).
Now let us examine the incentive of any government to deviate from=
Itknows that all future governments will then play f(x). But knowing
that all future governments will play f(x) it is optimal for the government in
question to choose m =f(x)
as well, by the definition of f. In other words,
if a government is going to deviate, the best deviation is simply to revert to
f(x) immediately. Thus, the cost of defecting from the m =£(x)
nile is to
revert immediately and permanently to the =f(x)
rule. Since utility is
higher under & than f, there is never an incentive to deviate from &.The
equilibrium is perfect, since in any subgaine in which a defection from
=£(x)
has occurred, it will be a Nash equilibrium for all governments to
revert to f(x).
For the case 8 =0.0,we have found a rule =&(x)
that has the property
that tJ(x) >U(x).
and thus have verified that such reputational equilibria
exist in our model, With U =0,and all other parameter values as in Table 1,
the time consistent rule is:= f(x)=—.165Pt +1.165
The following rule has higher utility for all
= = —.185Pt +1.185p1
The loss functions corresponding to these rules are:
F 1.726 —1.7261 f 1-i I-f U (x) =—(—)x i i x=—xSx t 2tLlT26l.726J
tt





Sinces1'—Sis positive definite, we have for allxthat
—= (s— st)x
>o.
Wehave not found such an example for S >0.0.
In an important sense, then, the time inconsistency problem isexaggerated,
in that nany "pre—commitment" equilibria can probably be sustained even in
situations where actions of future governments cannot be bound. The memoryless
time—consistent equilibrium is the lower limit of what can be obtained by a
sequence of governments, not the only outcome. We should stress, however, that
time consistency does impose costs, since the first—best, open—loop strategy
almost surely cannot be sustained as a perfect equilibrium. The reason is as
follows. Suppose that the sequence of governments pursues the open—loop solution
under the threat of reversion tom =f(x)if it ever violates the open loop rule.
We know thatitwill follow the sequence {frt}1J, to which correspondsasequence of
states, denoted 1k!0.Ateach t,wenaycalculatethe utility of continuing—37--
with the open—loop sequence, U2'G%), with the utility of reverting to
the time—consistent equilibrium, U(&). The threat of reverting to f will
continue to work only when (x) c U (x). However, at some point this
equality is reversed, and the government at that date actually prefers to revert
to the time—consistent equilibrium. Knowing that such a date will be reached,
earlier governments will also know that the open—loop path cannot be sustained.
OL TC.
This phenomenon is shown in Figure 5,whereat each t, we graph U. (x) —U(x),
with the 1%calculatedalong the open—loop path. As long as U?(&) —
ispositive, the government at t does not have an incentive to deviate. At
time t (here 1987), the government prefers to revert to the time—consistent
solution.
III. Policy Coordination in the Two—Country Model
The first part of the paper has dealt with economic policy in a single
econouzy. We now extend the same set of techniques to a two—country setting.
The goal is to compare "non—cooperative" equilibria (NC), in which each country
optimizes while taking as given the policies abroad, with "cooperative"
equilibria (c), in which binding commitments can be nade between the two
countries. Fornally, we treat the cooperative case as one in which a single
controller chooses the policies of the two countries. As in the early section,
we imist treat two separate types of equilibria: (i) the pre—commitmnent case, in
which the two countries (in NC) or the single controller (in C), can credibly
pre—commit to a rule or to an infinite sequence of actions; and (2) the
time—consistentcase, in which no pre—commitment in future periods is possible.
We turn first to the pre—commitment case.0.00
—38—
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The open—loop case is most easily dealt with. We, firBtappenda symmetric
foreign—country model to the home—country model just discussed. The model is
shown in Table 2. In the NC solution, each government at t =0solves for an
optimal sequence of monetary policies taking as given the sequence selected from
abroad. In the C solution-, a single controller chooses and jm*}0to
maximize a weighted average of intertemporal utilities at home and abroad. In
viewofthe symmetryassumedbetween the countries, jm}0 will equal {m*} as a
feature of both solutions, with the adjustment paths at home and abroad identical.
The key result is that non—cooperative control leads to over—contractionary
anti—inflation policies relative to the social optimum. Both countries are made
better off by a coordinated policy of less rapid disinflation.
In general, the dimensionality of the control problem is too high to
analyze the NC case analytically. An important special case, however, allows us
to establish analytically the keyfeaturesof the NC versus C solutions. Since
the findings are insightful, we begin with that special case. In particular, we
firstassume that aggregate demand and money demand are not interest sensitive
(a=e=0in the original model). This simplification allows us to determine
as a function of the current state vector together withand m, rather
than as a forward—looking variable dependent on the entire future sequence of
policies. Also, to reduce further the dimensionality, we set 0 =0,so that
wage change depends on the level of output but not its lagged rate of change.
Denoting the real exchange rate as r = +e —p,
we can write =Pt
+(l_X)r,
and = — p' = +(l_X)(r_r1).
Therefore, from the—40—
Table 2. Two—Country Model
Aggregate Demand
= + iq —


























c*c* —n t1_t vt_i
ExchangeRate
e=e +1 -i
t+i t t t—41—
wage equation, and the fact that Pt =w,we have =+ (l_A)(rt+i_r)
+4q.Note from this expression that inflation accelerated whenr+1 >ror
>0.In other words, a real depreciation between periods t and t+1 causes
inflation to accelerate, basically because real import prices rise. Carrying
out the same manipulation for the foreign country yields n1 = — (1—A)
(rt+i_rt) + • Notethat a real depreciation at home causes inflation to
fall abroad, while an appreciation at home causes foreign inflation to rise.
Here is the nub of the coordination problem: each country may have an incentive
to contract the econonr in order to appreciate the currency and thereby export
inflation abroad at the expense of the other country. Since the exchange rate
effects are bound to cancel out if each country chooses contractionary policies
to appreciate its currency, a coordinated policy can avoid the contractionary
policies, to the inatual benefit of both countries.
It only remains to determine r before solving for the two equilibria.




From (33), we see that the key to a real appreciation is to be more
contractionary than one's neighbor. The effort towards contraction leads to the
inefficiency of the non—cooperative outcome.
In any period, Pt and p are predetermined variables, so that the choice
of m and fix and respectively, in view of the nxney demand schedules.
Thus, we may think of the policy authorities as controlling and q4directly,—42—
and then use the sequences and {q*}0to find the paths of prices and
the policies 1%and as Pt + andp +ctn4.
We now write the home countryts optimization problem in canonical form. At
any ncment, there are two state variables, Pt and p1, and we write the




L: 1 L'ojL_iI+Li_I cLi_iJ
Notethat q is the control variable, and q is an exogenous forcing variable
from the point of view of the home country. The objective function is again
a discounted sum of quadratic loss functions in and
(35) U3 =(l/2)ZSt(q+fl2)
Note that =p—pC=(p_pC)+
Weset up a Lagrangian £ and take first—order conditions in the standard
way (note that is the co—state variable for Pt, and 2t for
t2 c 2
(36) £ =2Et=o+ s[(p—p)+
+ uE2P— + ÷a(l—y)(q_q4) —
+ 2ttt+a(i—Y)(q_o4)
—p]













=0> p = p + a(1—'i)(q_a4)
3L/3p1
= 0> + a(1—y)(q—a4)] — — u21I3 =0
Wenow invoke a sleight of hand. The foreign country is carrying out an
identical optimization, which by symmetry must yield = q.. Without specifying
the foreign country's problem, we simply invoke this symmetry condition as a
property of the equilibrium, in order to simplify the first—order conditions.
Note that when q = q, p equalsp, so that iTt =P - =
Using these facts, we rewrite the first—order conditions as:
(37) + a(l—y)) + ua(i—y) + $a(1_1)w + = 0
—I1lt_1/





IT—iT —ia=0 t+l t
By direct inspection of (371(b) and Cc), we can see that the system will satisfy
2t = We now nakethatsubstitution and also substitute for to write







Aslong as< El—*a(1—y)41, this system has a single root within the unit
circle and a single root outside the unit circle (the condition is sufficient,
though not necessary).5 Denote the stable root as (the superscript N-.44—
denotes non—cooperative case). Thus, the dynamics of inflationare:
(39) =
x5r
Startingfrom an inherited inflation rateito, the two economies converge to zero
inflation, with a mean lag of A'i/(l_A)years.
Now let us consider the cooperative case.Here, a single controller
chooses and to naximize en average of utilities in the twocountries.
Since the countries are identical, wemay assume simply that the controller
maximizes domestic utility subject to the constraint that =forall t.
With this constraint, the inflation equation is11t+l = +$q. The
Lagrangian for the single controller problem is therefore:
(ho) nax£ =_l,2E;0St{
+ + + —
{ }




Notethe relationship between (38) and (ni). Thecooperative dynamics are
found by Betting a =0in (38). a is the parameter which measures howlarge a
real appreciation is achieved for a given contractionof q relative to q*. It
thus indicates the importance of the "beggar—thy—neighbor"phenomenon, in which
each country (vainly) attempts to keep output lower athome than abroad in order
to export inflation. Since the single controllerrecognizes the futility of
each country, in a closed system, trying toexport inflation, the controller
simply sets a =0.That is the root of the gain to cooperation.—45—
The rntrix in (hi) again has a single stable root, this time denoted
x.6 The 'namics of inflation are now
(42) =
X1ir
Itis a simple nntter to prove that >fora >0,so that cooperative
control results in slower disinflation than non—cooperative control.1 Figure 6
illustrates the inflation and output paths of the home econonry under cooperation
and non—cooperation. The faster disinflation under NC is clearly brought about
by increased unemployment (i.e. reduced output) in the early years of the
disinflation process. Remember from our earlier discussion that the cumulative
output loss is the same for all paths that asymptotically reduce inflation to
zero.
Welfare Aspects of Cooperation
Assuming that governments are pursuing appropriate objectives (e.g. that
they use the "right" discount rate), it is easy to show that the cooperative
path, with less extreme disinflation, dominates the non—cooperative path. A
simple argument is as follows (direct computation would also make the same
point). Define the set of pareto efficient (E) pairs of sequences
that have the property that 1J0 is maximized given tJ, and is
maximized given U0.Itis well known that the set of pareto efficient
pairs may be found by maximizing wU0 +(l—w)Uwith respect to q}0 and
for all weights vS[0,11.Every pareto efficient sequence pair maximizes some
weighted average of U0 and U, and every sequence pair that maximizes
wU0 +(1—w)Uis pareto efficient.—46—
Figure 6
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Ko.—Coop.TSt ion—47—
The cooperative solution, by construction, gives the sequence pair
corresponding to w =0.5(i.e. equal weighting of the countries). It is the
unique solution to the problem. Since the non—cooperative solution also
yields a symmetric equilibrium, with U0 =U,it mast be that U <tJ,since
otherwise the non—cooperative solution would pareto dominate a known pareto
efficient solution.
We mentioned in the introduction that some critics of cooperation are
dubious of the assumption that governments tximize the proper social welfare
function. In particular, plausible arguments have been made that the
government's discount rate is less than the "true" B. If so, cooperation
might exacerbate rather than meliorate social welfare. The point is that
cooperation allows governments to pursue a more "leisurely" disinflation.
However, short—sighted governments might already be postponing the necessary
disinflation, in return for short—run gains to output. In an already distorted
policy environment, cooperation might further retard the necessary adjustment.
To examine this view, we computed the open—loop cooperative and
non—cooperative intertemporal utilities for a range of B', holding fixed the
"true" B at (l.l) (we use the simplified version of the two—country model for
these calculations). For each BG, we calculate the two equilibria and then
evaluate the social welfare of the resulting paths using B =(l.l)_l.As seen
from Figure 7 non—cooperation dominates cooperation when B0 is sufficiently
G
smaller than B, and cooperation dominates non—cooperation as long as B is
"close enough" or somewhat greater than B. Of course, for any B0 =B,open—loop








Figure 7. The Gains from Cooperation with MyopicGovernmentsa
=(1.1)']
aNote that the welfare scale on the y—axis has been adjusted by a multiplicative








not the level of but the difference of and which might cause cooperation
to be welfare reducing.
Policy Coordination and Time Consistency
We now leave the case of open—loop control and return to the more realistic
assumption that governments cannot bind their successors. In the
non—cooperative setting we are looking for an equilibrium characterized by rules
=f(x)and m =
f*(Xg)
that have the following property: for the home
country, f is optimal at time t given that all future governments at home play f
and that abroad the contemporaneous and all future governments play fM; while
for the foreign country, 4 is optimal under the analogous conditions. Note
that is the state vector including predetermined variables of both the home
and foreign economy. In particular, =<p,p, t—l 't_l' t—l' _1>
There are two key differences with the open—loop model previously
described. First, of course, is the inability of and to bind the
entire sequence of future moves. Second is the assumption that each government
takesas given the foreign rule rather than the foreign actions, so that optimal
moves todaytake into account the effects of today's actions on tomorrow's state
vector,and thus on the foreign governments' moves. It would be possible
insteadto calculate a time—consistent inilticountry equilibrium in which each
government takes as given the sequence of future moves (i.e. open—loop time
consistency), but we have not pursued that choice here.
As in the one—country case, the time—consistent equilibrium is solved as
the limit of a backward recursion. (For the calculations that follow, we revert—50—
to the complete two—country model, with non—zero values of a, C,ande). Using
the parameter values of the one—country model, we arrive at the following rules;
(I3) =—.286+.953p1
—.132p* +.21e6p*1 +.23 +
.O72a4
Figure 8comparesthe paths of the home econonw output for the non—cooperative
open—loop and non—cooperative time—consistent equilibria. As in the one—country
model, output losses are smaller in the early periods for TC than OL. The
inability to bind one's successors causes a bias towards more expansionary
policies and thus more rapid inflation, relative to the open—loop solution.
Significantly, it is no longer possible to rank social welfare under
open—loop versus time—consistent policies (for non—cooperative equilibria), as
it was in the one—country model. Remember the argument in the one—country
context. Open—loop control, by definition, picks the optimal sequence;
time—consistent policy, on the other hand, reflects an optimization under
additional constraints and therefore is inferior to the open—loop control. In
the two—country setting, the same logic does not apply. The open—loop sequence
is no longer the optimal sequence. Indeed we have seen that open—loop,
non—cooperative control is typically pareto inefficient. There is no
presumption that adding constraints to the optimization will now lower welfare,
particularly since constraints re being added abroad as well as at home. It is
true that the home country can no longer pre—commit to a sequence of moves, but
nowneithercan the foreign country. It is true that the home country prefers
an open—loop to time consistent policy assuming that the other country is fixed
at one or the other. With the other country's policy fixed, an open—loop policy0.00—
Figure 8. A Comparison of Non—Cooperative Control:
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Time—Consistent Rule—52—
at home can exactly replicate the time—consistent sequence, and presumably it
can do it better.
There are good economic reasons to believe that the time—consistent policy
may actually dominate the open—loop solution in the non—cooperative game. The
open—loop policy, we know, is over—contractionary relative to the efficient
equilibrium. Moving from open—loop control to time consistency causes policy to
become less contractionary and therefore pushes the econonw towards the
efficient equilibrium.
Now, let us consider the time—consistent cooperative equilibrium. Here we
imagine that a single controller each period sets m and m*, but now subject to
the time—consistency constraint. The single cooperative controller rmist
optimize while taking as giving the actions of single cooperative controllers in
later periods. We should like to determine whether time—consistent cooperation
is superior to time—consistent non—cooperation. As we have noted in several
places Rogoff (1983) has devised an ingenious example where cooperation reduces
welfare. Simply, time—consistency leads governments to be over—inflationary
relative to the open—loop pre—commitment equilibrium. Cooperation further
exacerbates this over—inflationary bias by removing each government's fear of
currency depreciation.
Interestingly, our results run counter to Rogoff's: cooperation is
superior in welfare terms to non—cooperation. While the cooperative solution is
more inflationary (see Figure 9), as we might expect, it is not overly inflation-
ary in a welfare sense. The less rapid disinflation merely corrects the

























































































































































































































































































































































follows. [n the symmetric country model, the single controller always adopts
symmetric rules so that e =0for all t. Since the exchange rate is the sole
potential source of time inconsistency in this model, and since it is always
equal to zero, the cooperative time—consistent solution is also the open—loop
cooperative solution. For a cooperative controller, there is no
time—consistency problem in our model (since the countries are symmetric). The
single controller can reach the first—best optimum solution for open—loop
cooperative control.
tn sum, we have shown examples where cooperative control is more
inflationary than open—loop non—cooperative control and time—consistent
non—cooperative control. In both cases, the cooperative solution is welfare
improving relative to the non—cooperative equilibrium. In view of Hogoff's
example, it will be difficult indeed to set out general principles on the gains
from cooperation under the constraint of time consistency. Comparing our
example with his, the key difference seems to rest on the source of the
time—consistency problem. In Rogoff's case, the problem arises from
forward—looking wage setters and cooperation exacerbates the problem. In our
model, the problem arises from forward—looking exchange market participants, and
cooperation eliminates the problem.
Conclusions
This study represents work in progress on the gains to coordination in
dynamic nacroeconomic models. Our focus has been purely methodological, and
preparatory to attempts at a quantitative assessment of international policy—55—
coordination. The nEthodological issues arise from the wide variety of possible
equilibrium concepts in nulticountry dynamic games. The gaines can be solved
under the assumption of pre—commitment versus time—consistency; open—loop versus
closed—loop behavior; and non—cooperative versus cooperative decision—making.
These three dimensions are all independent, so any choice along each dimension
is possible.
Moreover, in some cases there nay be m.iltiple eq3lilibria. For example,
there are probably many time—consistent, non—cooperative equilibria that depend
on the "threat—reputation" mechanism outlined in the paper. As yet, we have
made no systematic attempt to search for such equilibria.
This work should now be used to gain empirical insight into the cooperation
issue. For all of the discussion surrounding time consistency, for example,
there is not a single empirical investigation of its importance in the
macroeconomics literature. Similarly, there are no reliable measures of the
gains to cooperation in the simpler, pre—commitment equilibria. Such
quantitative work deserves a high priority.—56—
Appendix
We shall present in this appendix the derivation of the four policy rules
discussed in this paper. All of these rules are obtained as thestationary
limit of backward recursions using a methodo1or similar to Basar and Olsder
(1982) or Kydland (1975). The only significant difference with these authors is
the fact the followers' actions are represented here by a forwardlooking
variable, the exchange rate.
Let us consider a two—country world. The world econorw is characterized by
an n—dimensional vector of state variables,x and the domestic currency price
of the foreign currency is e. In each country the authorities seek to maximize
a welfare function W, i =1,2,and can use a set of policy instruments denoted
where is an m.—dimensional vector. The dynamics of the worldecononw








where denotes the stacked vector of instruments for the world econorrvf and A,
B, C, D, F and 0 are matrixes of parameters. Note that matrixes A, B, C are
defined differently than matrixes A, B, C in the rest of the paper.
Let us denote by 'it the vectors of targets for each country. and











The value function of country 1 for period t is defined by:
(A15) V1(x) =Mm_(l/2)tc21T1 +81Vi+1(x+1),given
Ult





whereKit and is the submatrixes of Kt andcorresponding to 1J1.




where MMt is an (rn1+ m2)x(m1+ m2) dimensional matrix and TiNt is an (m+ m2)x n
dimensional natrix.











These formula hold for period T with and K,1 defined as above and =0.




(A23) 8it = +i(A+BH÷crtYs1t+1(A÷BH-4crt);
i =1,2
We have thus obtained both recursion rules and starting values for the set
of natrixes r. and We define as the time consistent solution the
stationary solution to which this system converges for t =0as T goes to
infinity. We do not know of any general result concerning the convergence of
this process. However in our empirical applications we have not run into major
problems. Cohen and Michel (1981*) show that in a one dimensional case this kind
of a recursion does have a fix—point.
The Open—Loop Solution
The open—loop solution corresponds to a one—shot game where the authorities
announce at time zero the whole path of their policies. It thus does not by
definition require the use of a backward recursion procedure. The set of
dynamic equations formed by the state variable difference equations and the
first—order conditions corresponding to the optimal control problem of the
authorities could for example be solved explicitly by using the method proposed
in Blanchard and Kahn (1980) or numerically with a nnltiple shooting algorithm
(see Lipton, Poterba, Sachs and Summers (1982)). However, we shall present here
a backward recursion procedure which leads to a simple algorithm.
The optimal control problem faced by the authorities of country i leads to





where is the vector of co—state variables or shadow costs which the
authorities of country i associate with each of the state variables and,
similarly is the co—state variable corresponding to the exchange rate.8






(A27) aH./e =L'&2T + + =
Letus first of all derive the recursion equations at period t. One major
difference with the time consistent case is the existence of u,theco—state
variable corresponding to the exchange rate at time t. Since e0 is not
pre—deterruined, it can be set freely by the authorities in the initial period by
announcing a proper path of future policies. Its shadow cost in the first
period, p1, is zero. is thus a predetermined variable equal to zero in the
first period and has to be added to the vector of state variables, x, when the
recursion relations are defined.
More precisely we shall assume that the problem is solved for t+1 and that
the following relations hold:
(A28) e1 =1t11 +h1p
(A29) t+l =At1xti +6t+lt+l
(A30) =r+1x+1
+
Letus now define the following matrixes:—62—
= A1 =?4j&2.;kh =
(A31) 42 = A2 =1A;Ak = I=1,2







Equations (A25) to (An) can be rewritten in matrix form:





where '2n and 12 denote identity matrixes of dimensions 2n and 2respectively.





















































We now need to obtain starting values for the recursions thus defined. If
we assume as above that the exchange rate stabilizes at time T and that
T+l =0,we get:
=(l—F)D;Kt =(1—F)G;3T =0;t+l =0;¶21 =
Theopen—loop solution is the stationary limit to which this recursion
converges. It should be noted that here the policy rule is not only a function
of the state variables, but also of the costate variables
Let us give a simple example in the case where each country has a single
policy instrument. The policy rule is =Fx











The policy rule appears to be of a more complicated form than the time
consistent rule. it is a function not only of the current state variables but
of the lagged values of these state variables and of the lagged moves.
The Buiter Solution
Buiter (1933) proposes a solution to the time inconsistency problem which
we discuss in the paper. Formally his strate' amounts to setting p equal to
zero and suppressing equations (A37).










Equations (A28) to (A30) become:


























From(A38) we derive r and A which give Ii:
lit = +
Thesystem of recursive equations thus obtained is solved backward from T with
the same starting values as above:
=(l—F)D;KT(l_F)G; AT+l =
0
The Optimal Linear Rule
The problem here is to derive the optimal linear rule, i.e. the constant
feedbackrule which yields the higher welfare for the authorities of each
country. It can be divided into two steps. The first step consists in




U =rx,the value of the welfare for each country, w1(r) and w2(r). Then, in
a second step, the optimal values of and r2 are calculated using a numerical
gradient nethod. We shall not discuss here the second step for which we refer
the reader to Roth (1979). The first step is again solved by backward recursion
which proved nore tractable for the repeated calculations imposed by the
gradient nethod.














therecursion is thus simply
(Ab2) Mt =(F_H+1B)(a+1(A+cr)
—(Dcr)1
which, starting with MT' has a stationary solution for values of the parameters




iihere C22 and C21 are subniatrixes of C, the natrix of row eigenvectors of the






1.See, for example, W. Nordhaus, "The Political Business Cycle," Review of
Economic Studies 42 (1915), pp. 169—190.
2.
1+A—(+6)C1(5+ap—aA) —i—(+e)aC' —oi—x+(p+e )a- [6i-a(1—A )!
A 0 0 1—A
—(6+ap—aA)A 0 16(i—A)1A'











3.Using the notation of the appendix, it is readily checked that if a =0,C
and
N1in(Al) are null natrixes, and G in (Al) is equal to -p. This implies
that the rwney stock hasnodirect effect on either the state variables or on—70—
the government's targets: output and inflation.. Thus the first—order condition
(A25) reduces to 8t+l =0.





The differential system (38) becomes:




0 0 C -
Thissystem is saddle point stable under the conditions discussed in the
text and has one stable root and two unstable roots A and 1/8.One
variable ITis backward looking while and are forward looking.
Given that 1/8 > 1, it is clear from the third equation that along the stable
path nust always be equal to zero, so that = for all t.
5.The roots of the system can be found by solving the characteristic
equation:
A2—(w+ l/ + 2)A + (l/8)o = 0, where cs=[i -
Weassume w > 0. To show that there is exactly one stable root 0 < A < 1 and
one unstable root 1 < X, observe the values of the characteristic equation
0(A) at A = 0 and A = 1. c(o) = (l/8)>0 and 0(1) = —fl2 -11/6-
C0. Also, for A >> 1, 0(A) > 0. Thus, there is exactly one root between 0
and 1, and one root exceeding 1.—71—
The stable root is
=(w+l/+fl)/2-(1/2)[(w+i÷ 22
The unstable root is:
=(w+i/S+$ip)/2+(1/2)[(w ++ 2)2-
6.The roots for the c6operative case can be found by setting a =0(i.e.
=1)in the equations for the roots derived in Footnote 5.




7. It was shown in footnote 6 that = whena =0.To prove that
>fora >0,we need only show that a(A_Af)f3a >0for all a. We know
that 3(X)/3a =0.Consider
=(l/2)(l-y)$I-l+( - 1/5+( + '/+22-





Taking the square root of both sides and dividing gives
-1/8+fl2)j(w+its+,*22-w/8}1/2<i
Substituting into the expression for 3(A7/3a, we see—72--
C 0 for all a.
Thus (x—x!)/aa >0for all a.
8.Note that in the paper the notation is slightly different, with being
the co—state variable corresponding to the exchange rate in the one—country
case.—73—
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